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Wednesday 12 October 2005

Info Post
The story we've been anticipating since late August on security at test and research reactors by ABC News has just been posted over at the network's Web site. I've only taken a cursory look at the story so far, but needless to say it fails to mention many of the details we've uncovered in the last few weeks -- including the fact that personnel at a number of reactors alerted the NRC to the presence of the interns, and the fact that they were acting suspiciously and asking questions about security.

Once again, for those of you concerned specifically with the test and research reactors, here's a statement from my NEI colleague Felix Killar on exactly what the situation is as it stands today:
Every research reactor has multiple layers and techniques of security. These include surveillance and detection equipment, and alarms with an armed security force response.

University research reactors are licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Since 9/11, the NRC has required site-specific security enhancements for reactors of two megawatts of generating capacity and greater, and for reactors of less than two megawatts of capacity. There continues to be coordination between the NRC and the research reactor community on ways to further enhance security commensurate with the small volumes of irradiated fuel in these reactors. A second round of security requirements from the NRC is expected in the near future.

All of the uranium fuel at research reactors is either in the reactor vessel or has been irradiated in the reactor and is securely stored. For this reason, even a suicidal terrorist who might be willing to risk lethal exposure to steal this material – which is typically quite heavy – would have to spend some period of time trying to steal it. The material is not accessible in a way that would allow anyone to make off with that material in 20 or 30 minutes.

The amount of uranium fuel in research reactors – most of which are below ground level – is sufficiently small that even in the event of accident – there is virtually no risk to the general public even in close proximity to the buildings that house the research reactors.
I'll have more in the morning once I get a chance to talk to some of my colleagues, but in the meantime, if you work at any of the research reactors named in the story, please get into contact with us here at NEI Nuclear Notes, as we'd like to hear about what you might have seen when the interns came to visit.

We're sure to see some pickup online, as Drudge is already fronting the story. And be sure to read this reaction from Red State.

UPDATE: Lots of interesting details from today's Kansas City Star (registration required), which talked to officials at Kansas State, Missouri-Columbia and Ohio State:

Posing as prospective graduate students, two young women tried to get inside Kansas State University’s nuclear reactor last summer.

They videotaped the building and asked questions about security, according to reactor workers. But they weren’t terrorists or protesters. Instead, they were part of an undercover team of ABC News interns probing for security weaknesses at reactors on 25 college campuses, including K-State and the University of Missouri-Columbia.

Even before the two women made it to K-State’s reactor, however, their strange behavior had drawn the attention of the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Further...

When [Melia] Patria and [Hsing] Wei showed up at the K-State reactor, the staff had a good idea who the women really were. After other campus reactors reported similarly strange visits, federal authorities had figured out that the visitors were actually undercover reporters. The FBI passed the tip along to K-State.

In hopes of proving their suspicions, reactor employees asked the women to pose for a photograph. To get the shot, Cullens said, he had to resort to his own little deception.

“They were playing the flirt card to get information,” he said. “We wanted a picture of them for the FBI, so we flirted back.”

At one point, a reactor researcher asked the women what had drawn them to K-State. One of them, Cullens recalled, said her boyfriend lived in Kansas.

“We asked where, and she sort of pointed off to the southwest and said, ‘Over there,’ ” he said. “We figured there had to be something strange going on.”

And here's more details on the trip the interns took to Ohio State University:

Ohio State University’s reactor was one of the first visited by Wei and Patria. Earle Holland, director of research information, said that the women acted suspiciously and that the staff asked them to leave before the tour ended.

After the women left, the staff called the police, who called the FBI, who called the NRC and Homeland Security.

When you review the ABC News account of the Ohio State visit, there's no mention of the fact that the interns were asked to leave before the tour ended -- just a quote from a security consultant proclaiming that "the system failed". Seems to me that the opposite is actually the case, and that the system worked, which is exactly why authorities were alerted, and many of the institutions involved knew the interns were on their way. More later.

ABC News has posted photos of Wei and Patria at the "Loose Nukes" Web page, along with the rest of the interns. Also, our friend Pat Cleary has cross-posted his Red State item on the story over at the NAM Blog.

UPDATE: My colleague Lisa Stiles-Shell had something to say about this passage from ABC News on their visit to MIT:
An ABC News producer parked a large Ryder truck next to the reactor facility and was not questioned or challenged.
Which led Lisa to write to me:
Yep, they're right. You can drive down that street. Hell, you can LIVE across the street from it and I did. So what? They can't steal the stuff. And there isn't enough material there to cause significant death and destruction even if you dropped a truck full of explosives directly on top of the reactor pool--other than the deaths and destruction from the initial explosion, of course.
Pure, unadulterated hysteria. Sound science nowhere to be found.

UPDATE: NRC has posted a letter to ABC's Brian Ross from Roy Zimmerman of the agency's Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response:
Based on our review of your observations, our continuing review of site-specific security enhancements, and our knowledge of the potential risks, we continue to believe that the Nation’s RTRs remain safe and secure. Furthermore, we recently issued letters to each RTR licensee to obtain additional information and emphasize our expectations for maintaining effective RTR security in the current threat environment. In these letters, we requested each RTR to verify its implementation of the previous site-specific security measures and provide additional details. The NRC will review these measures.

Moreover, the radiological consequences of an attack on RTRs would be low due to the small quantities of radioactive material present, the reactor structure and shielding designs, and the safety and security measures in place. Also, attempts to sabotage the facility or steal the nuclear material would trigger an armed response and activate pre-established emergency response plans. Even if a sabotage attack were attempted against an RTR, we are convinced that the potential for significant radiation-related health effects to the public is highly unlikely.
ANOTHER UPDATE: Charles Johnson of Little Green Footballs just linked to the story, but apparently hasn't caught wind of the news that ABC's methods are coming into question. Somebody at Red State is wondering why he hasn't picked up on it yet.

YET ANOTHER UPDATE: MIT is now responding to a number of assertions that ABC News made about its visit to that institution's research reactor:
MIT and the MIT Nuclear Reactor Laboratory take a rigorous approach toward safety and desire to learn from any investigation. However the issues raised by ABC have been thoroughly studied and reviewed. They do not represent security breaches, nor are they issues with which MIT and the reactor lab are unfamiliar.

The floor plans were obtained from a web site unaffiliated with MIT that archives old material previously removed from the web. Material is posted to this site without regard to its currency or accuracy. These plans are also very rudimentary and are not sensitive.

The reactor's operating schedule provides no sensitive information nor can any be inferred from it. In fact, MIT posts the operating schedule online because, as one of the foremost research reactor labs in the country, it provides researchers at MIT and at other universities with the information essential for planning scientific experiments at the laboratory.

With respect to the truck, it did not actually enter the secure perimeter around the reactor. The perimeter distances have been confirmed by an independent study commissioned by MIT to assess the impact of possible terrorist actions against the MIT reactor following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The study ran through all the likely scenarios of attack and concluded that the core of the MIT research reactor would not be breached. The study determined that even in the unlikely event that the exterior building surrounding the reactor core was damaged, the core itself would not be harmed and there would be no release of radiation. It also determined that a large bomb going off in a truck parked within even a few feet of the reactor building would not breach the containment of the reactor's core.

MIT's reactor's core is quite small, about the size of a dormitory refrigerator, and is fully enclosed in a radiation-shielded structure consisting of several feet of concrete and other materials, which itself is housed within the containment building comprising different layers of concrete and steel, all of which would be nearly impossible to breach at one time.

MIT's director of security and police chief, John Difava, is a former superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police force who was appointed by the governor to direct and coordinate security at Logan Airport following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. He works with law enforcement officials at the local, state and federal levels on security plans for MIT's research reactor.

"In the event of any sort of attack, I would choose to be in the reactor lab because the containment building is the safest place on campus," said Difava.

For a copy of MIT's letter to ABC News, click here (PDF). The Boston Business Journal has already picked up on the MIT statement.

ANOTHER UPDATE: TVNewser picks up the threads.

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